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I. Introduction
Imagine the following scenario: Our fictional defendant Scarlett Snopes has been
charged with a felony. Ms. Snopes is well-known to the community - lay and legal
alike - as a person with a long history of mental illness and attendant legal problems.
She has been civilly committed several times and has, on occasion, sought treatment
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OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
voluntarily. When she is arrested and charged with threatening her community mental
health center case manager, a mental status examination is sought without objection.'
Ms. Snopes resides in a state in which this evaluation simultaneously addresses both
issues of competence and responsibility
In a written report following the evaluation, the examiner concludes: (1) that Ms.
Snopes is not presently competent to stand trial,3 and (2) that at the time of the crime,
she lacked the capacity to appreciate the wrongfulness of her acts.4 After receiving
this report, the trial court determines that it is in the interest of justice that Ms. Snopes
be acquitted by reason of insanity' and enters a judgment so stating. Although now
acquitted, Ms. Snopes remains in the state hospital where she was remanded for her
mental status evaluation; she will call the hospital home until she can prove either that
she is no longer dangerous or that she is no longer mentally ill.6 Now everyone -
save perhaps Ms. Snopes - can feel good because the poor town lunatic' has had a
1. The presence of mntal illness is not, of course, synonymous with incompetence to stand trial or
the lack of criminal responsibility. Even moderate evidence of mental illness, however, may be enough
to get an examination for competency and/or responsibility ordered. The Model Penal Code mandates
an examination when "there is reason to doubt" the defendant's competence or "reason to believe" that
mental illness will be an i;sue in the case, or if the defendant has indicated an intent to plead insanity.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.05 (1980).
2. Competence addreses whether the defendant has the mental capacity to stand trial, e.g., whether
or not she has a factual and rational understanding of the proceeding and can consult with her lawyer
in the preparation of her defense. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960). Responsibility
addresses whether the defendant, at the time of the crime, was able to appreciate the consequences of
her acts or to conform her conduct to the requirements of the law. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01
(1980). For a list of states that use the single evaluation process, see infra note 79.
3. It is unconstitutional to try an incompetent defendant. See Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384
(1966). Responsibility an1 competence are terms often misunderstood and misused. A competency
determination does not involve questions of guilt or innocence, but rather whether the defendant has a
sufficient understanding of the proceedings as well as the ability to effectively consult with counsel. It
thus involves the defendanfs present mental state, not her mental state at the time of the crime. See
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975). The confusion of the terms competence and responsibility
is widespread. In Pate, the Supreme Court excused counsel's misuse of the concepts in view of the fact
that the Illinois statute itself referred to competence and responsibility with only one term: insanity. See
Pate, 383 U.S. at 384-35 & n.6. Nor is this misuse limited to the legal profession. The mental health
professionals doing the evaluations, which in turn result in legal determinations, also demonstrate a
profound misapprehension of the differences between the two concepts. See HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL
LABORATORY OF COMMrNrrY PSYCHIATRY FINAL REPORT, COMPETENCY To STAND TRIAL AND
MENTAL ILLNESs (1973).
4. This is commonly referred to as the cognitive prong of the insanity test, e.g., the defendant does
not know her acts are wrong. The volitional prong contemplates whether the defendant is able to
conform her acts to the requirements of the law. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 cmt. at 166-67 (1980).
5. The term "insanity" has been criticized and is now often replaced by "mental disease or defect."
See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01 (1980). The Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards use the phrase
"mental nonresponsibility." CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-6.1 (1989).
6. An acquittee may be held until she has regained her sanity or is no longer dangerous. This period
of time may well exceed the period for which the defendant could have been incarcerated if convicted.
See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983).
7. One would wish that such manifestly pejorative words were a thing of the far distant past.
Consider, however, references to the word "lunatic" by the Hawaii Supreme Court, see Hawaii v.
Rodrigues, 679 P.2d 615, 618 (Haw. 1984), and the Arkansas Legislature, which did not remove the
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humane and proper disposition!
Should not Ms. Snopes herself be pleased with the result? After all, she has been
acquitted, hasn't she? Well, yes, but her acquittal by reason of insanity comes with
strings attached. These strings - the adverse consequences addressed in Part I -
may be far preferable to a conviction and a sentence for some but not for others?
Because Ms. Snopes was acquitted while she was still incompetent, she was denied
the chance to decide how she would cast her lot.10
To put the issue in Ms. Snopes' case another way: Does the right not to be tried or
convicted while incompetent" extend to the right not to be subject to a pretrial
acquittal by reason of insanity while incompetent? The answer to that question resides
in the posing and answering of narrower questions. First, is there a need for such an
extension: That is to say, can an acquittal by reason of insanity actually occur through
a process short of a trial? Second, if a pretrial insanity acquittal may occur, is the
constitutional violation inherent in trying or convicting an incompetent defendant also
present for that pretrial insanity acquittal?
It is the premise of this article that the answer to these questions is a resounding
yes. Yes, an acquittal by reason of insanity can occur without a trial, 2 thus
mandating an extension of the constitutional principle to include acquittals that happen
short of a trial. Yes, an acquittal by reason of insanity that is imposed upon an
word from its statutory nomenclature until 1997.
8. It was a similar factual setting that gave the Missouri Court of Appeals pause in Briggs v.
Missouri, 509 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974). Defense counsel, without the client's knowledge or
consent, gave notice of'intention to plead insanity. See id at 155. The state's attorney "accepted" the
notice of the plea, a procedure required under state law that consequently gave the court the authority
to enter an acquittal and commit the defendant to the state hospital to be "held and treated." Id. at 156.
This entire process, which occurred over a period of more than six months, happened without the
defendant's presence, knowledge, or consent. See id Moreover, the appellate court noted, it happened
without the trial court making a finding that the defendant, whose competence had been questioned, was
fit to proceed. See idt at 156-57.
9. There are several reasons why a defendant may choose to forego the use of the insanity defense.
These reasons include: factual innocence, stigma, long periods of confinement, and collateral
consequences. See David S. Cohn, Offensive Use of the Insanity Defense: Imposing the Insanity Defense
Over the Defendant's Objection, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 295, 296 (1988). Unabomber defendant
Theodore Kaczynski's adamant opposition to the use of the insanity defense in his capital case is one
high-profile illustration of a defendant wanting to forego the defense even in the face of severe
consequences.
10. Of course, Ms. Snopes or any other defendant might voluntarily choose to pursue an insanity
acquittal. It might be far preferable to a conviction, particularly under certain circumstances, e.g., when
the offense charged is a capital crime. But, if the acquittal happens while she is incompetent, she has
been denied the right to make that choice. That right of decision making is highly valued in our system
and, indeed, the defendant's right to autonomous decision making is one of the reasons that incompetent
defendants may not be tried. See Bruce J. Winick, Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead
Guilty: A Restated Proposal and a Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 571,
576 (1995).
11. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966).
12. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.07 (1980). This section provides that a court may, on motion from
the defendant, enter an acquittal based on the report of the examination without a hearing, if none is
requested.
1997]
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 1997
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
incompetent defendant is as constitutionally offensive as a trial and conviction of an
incompetent defendant.'3
An acquittal by reason of insanity is sufficiently adverse and is in many ways more
akin to a conviction than to an outright acquittal. 4 Although not technically punish-
ment,"5 it involves substantial infringement of rights. The legal literature has devoted
significant space to the issue of a criminal defendant's competence to stand trial and
to the issue of the insanity plea. 6 The problem of a pretrial insanity acquittal of an
incompetent defendant, on the other hand, has not been extensively examined. In
undertaking that task, this article will, in Part II, review the law and practice of
competency determinations. Part I will address the adverse consequences of an
insanity acquittal. Part IV will examine the relevant provisions of the Model Penal
Code and the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards. Part V considers
various state court decisions in which this issue had arisen.
II. The Law of Competence
A. Core Principles
An incompetent defendant may not be tried and convicted in a criminal
proceeding. 7 This nile is grounded in common law 8 and constitutional 9 principles.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 27-28 for a discussion of the rationale behind preventing the
trial and conviction of an incompetent defendant.
14. Prior to 1800, if the mental illness were extreme enough to warrant excuse from the crime, the
defendant was acquitted outright; there were no post-acquittal proceedings or consequences. See
Abraham L. Halpem, The Insanity Verdict, The Psychopath, and Post-Acquittal Confinement, 24 PAC.
L.J. 1125, 1128 (1993).
15. See generally Eric Silver, Punishment or Treatment? Comparing the Lengths of Confinement
of Successful and Unsuccessful Insanity Defendants, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAv, 375 (1995) (discussing
the punitive components of insanity acquittals).
16. The focus has ben both practice-oriented and jurisprudential. See generally MARTIN BLINDER,
PSYCHIATRY IN THE EVERYDAY PRACTICE OF LAW: A LAWYER'S MANUAL FOR CASE PREPARATION, (3d
ed. 1992); ETHICAL PROBLEMS FACING THE CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYER: PRACTICAL ANSWERS TO
TOUGH QUESTIONS, (Rodney J. Uphoff ed., 1995); Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal
Defendants: Beyond Dusky and Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 539 (1993); David S. Cohn, Offensive Use
of the Insanity Defense: Imposing the Insanity Defense over the Defendant's Objection, 15 HASTINGS
CONST L.Q. 295 (1988).
17. This prohibition is often phrased as: an incompetent defendant may not be "tried and convicted."
Drope v. Missouri, 420 U S. 162, 172 (1975). However, there is some variation, Michigan provides that
an incompetent defendant shall not be "proceeded against." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2022 (West
1992). In Arizona, a defendant may not be tried, convicted, sentenced or punished while incompetent.
See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4502 (West Supp. 1997). One commentator has stated that only
"adverse adjudications" ara prohibited. Bonnie, supra, note 16, at 542. See infra text accompanying notes
93-159 (discussing the adverse consequences of an insanity acquittal). Allowing non-adverse proceedings
to occur with an incompetent defendant leaves the door open for innocence-only hearings. See infra text
accompanying notes 229-41 (discussing innocence-only hearings). Innocence-only hearings are
proceedings designed to protect the incompetent defendant's rights by ensuring that she is not being held
indefinitely while being nrstored to competence unless there is some basis for the charge.
18. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24.
19. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 384 (1966).
[Vol. 50:495
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The term competence2 has many meanings in different legal contexts,2 but is used
here in its classic criminal sense as set out by the United States Supreme Court in
Dusky v. United States.' The test enunciated in that case was whether the defendant
has "sufficient present ability"' to consult with her lawyer with a "reasonable degree
of rational understanding" and has "a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings" against her The absence of either of these factors renders a defendant
incompetent and, accordingly, unavailable for trial.
This requirement is so fundamental that due process mandates that the trial court
address it even if defense counsel fails to raise it. For example, if there is a bona fide
issue as to the defendant's competence, the court must, sua sponte, order an
examination.' Once a bona fide question as to competence has been raised, the
criminal proceedings are suspended while the defendant's mental state is assessed
The need for a defendant to be competent has been ascribed to at least four
underlying principles First, accurate proceedings require the defendant's full
cooperation. Second, constitutionally mandated procedural safeguards are only
meaningful if there is a competent defendant to exercise them. Third, the integrity of
the legal system necessitates proceedings that are instituted only against those who are
20. It has been suggested that competence is an outmoded term in the mental disability field. See
Bonnie, supra note 16, at 540. It is certainly a term that can cause confusion and possess varied
meanings, some of which are pejorative, others not. Synonyms are readily available. Often, for instance,
the phrase "fitness to proceed" is used instead of "competence to stand trial." See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 4.05 (1980). "Capacity" is another rough equivalent, though it can be used in other contexts as well,
i.e., as a substitute for criminal responsibility. For years, some states used the term "insanity" for both
competence and responsibility. Even today, Alabama continues to refer to competence as sanity. See
ALA. CODE § 15-16-21 (1995).
21. According to Justice Thomas, when writing for the majority in Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389
(1993), the identification of multiple meanings of the word competence is of value only to scholars and
psychiatrists and is not an undertaking required by the due process clause. See id. at 402. But see id. at
413 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting that the Court has recognized the different ways in which a
defendant's mental state may be at issue in a legal proceeding and has required assessments to be tailored
accordingly); see also Bonnie, supra note 16 at 557 (describing different kinds of competence, e.g.,
competence for medical decision-making versus competence for financial affairs). See generally Bruce
J. Winick, Competency to Consent to Treatment: The Distinction Between Assent and Objection, 28
Hous. L. REv. 15 (1991) (discussing the different levels of competence in the area of informed consent).
22. 362 U.S. 402 (1960) (per curiam). This was a one-page decision, but its test for competence has
remained unchanged over the years.
23. Id. Competency's focus on the defendant's present mental ability has led it to also be called
"present insanity." Pate, 383 U.S. at 384.
24. Dusky, 362 U.S. at 402.
25. See Drape v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 180 (1975).
26. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-305 (Michie 1995).
27. See Barbara A. Weiner, Mental Disability and the Criminal Law, in SAMUEL J. BRAKEL ET AL.,
THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 693,694 (3d ed. 1985); Bonnie, supra note 16, at 551-54. The
reliability and accuracy of the criminal justice system are at risk if an incompetent defendant is unable
to comprehend the value of communicating exculpatory facts to her lawyer. See id. at 552. This is not
just a protection of the defendant but rather serves the strong societal investment in a criminal justice
system that is reliable.
1997]
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competent to comprehend them. Fourth, the goals underpinning sentencing after
conviction are contingent upon a competent defendant.'
The first three of these factors apply with equal force to an acquittal by reason of
insanity. The first two concerns, which focus on the fairness of the process from the
vantage point of both the defendant and the system, would be undermined by
acquitting an incompetent defendant. The dignity of the system, the third principle,
would be equally discredited by an insanity acquittal of someone not even competent
to enter a plea. Finally, the fourth factor is not relevant because punishment is not a
permissible goal for a person who has been acquitted."
Six years after the United States Supreme Court set out the test for competency to
stand trial in Dusky v. United States," the Court revisited the competency question
in Pate v. Robinson." In Pate, the government conceded that a defendant must be
competent before being tried." It asserted, however, that the defendant had failed to
request a competency hearing, and thus had waived his right not to be tried while
incompetent. The government also contended that there was insufficient evidence for
the court to sua sponte order a hearing to assess competence. The pertinent statutory
provision required a hearing if there were a "bona fide" doubt33 as to the defendant's
competence to stand trial.'
The Court first took issue with the government's waiver argument, highlighting the
contradiction in suggesting that an incompetent defendant could "knowingly or
intelligently 'waive' his right to have the court determine his capacity to stand trial."'"
Further, the Court stated, the defendant through counsel had consistently placed his
"present sanity" at "issue,' and thus the issue could not be considered waived. 7
28. Those goals include deterrence, rehabilitation, and retribution. See Weiner, supra note 27, at
694. To the extent that "punishment" is a goal when convicting and sentencing a defendant, that is not
applicable for an acquittal. However, defendants who are acquitted by reason of insanity are usually
confined and subjected to treatment after the acquittal. Thus, the goals of deterrence (at least specific
deterrence) and rehabilitation are relevant even for insanity acquittees. Moreover, it has been suggested
that the confinement of insanity acquittees does in fact reflect a societal need to punish. See Silver, supra
note 15, at 385.
29. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 86 (1992) (holding that the State of Louisiana had no
punitive interest and could not punish an insanity acquittee who had had not been convicted of a crime).
But see Silver, supra note 15, at 385-87 (discussing a study which suggests that insanity acquittees are
punished according to the seriousness of offenses for which they were acquitted).
30. 362 U.S. 402 (1960)
31. 383 U.S. 375 (1966).
32. See id. at 378.
33. "Bona fide" doubt was the language used in Pate. See id. at 385. The issue is often cast in
terms of reasonable catuse or reason to doubt. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 n.13 (1993);
WEINER, supra note 27, a, 696. The level of doubt necessary to mandate court inquiry and mental health
assessment of a defendant's competence has engendered much litigation.
34. See 725 ILL COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/104-11 (West 1992).
35. Pate, 383 U.S. at 384. The Court still has not decided conclusively whether a defendant may
waive the right to be competent when tried. See Riggins v. Nevada, 504 U.S. 127, 138 (1992). But see
Winick, supra note 10, at 858-86. Professor Winick continues to refine his argument that, in some cases,
a marginally competent d.-fendant should be able to proceed with her case, rather than endure the delay
occasioned by a determination of incompetence. See id.
36. At that time, the Illinois statutes used the word "insanity" to describe both competence to stand
[Vol. 50:495
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Next, the Court determined that there was sufficient evidence before the trial judge to
raise a bona fide doubt as to the defendant's competence. 8 Accordingly, the trial
judge's failure to have a hearing on competence violated the defendant's constitutional
right to a fair trial.
Nine years later, in Drope v. Missouri," the Court expanded on the right not to be
tried while incompetent. Drope, like Pate before it, involved the question of whether
the trial court had enough information about the defendant's mental state to require
further inquiry into competence.4' Drope's counsel had obtained a psychiatric
evaluation prior to trial and had sought a continuance for further psychiatric evaluation
and treatment. No action was taken on the continuance motion and when the trial date
arrived, defense counsel objected to going forward. The court overruled the objection
and the trial began.42 During trial, Drope's counsel moved for a mistrial after his
client attempted suicide. The mistrial motion was denied and Drope was convicted.
The United States Supreme Court held that there was evidence to create a
"sufficient doubt" as to Drope's competence.43 The Court recited three categories of
evidence that bear upon a defendant's competence: (i) evidence of irrational
behavior,' (ii) conduct during trial,45 and (iii) prior medical testimony concerning
competence. ' Any combination of these factors or even one standing alone may
provide sufficient evidence to mandate "further inquiry" into the defendant's
competence.41 Here, the Court stated that, although the exact basis for the defense
continuance was unclear from the "inartfully drawn" motion, the issue of the
defendant's incompetence had been raised pretrial.48 Moreover, the Court said, even
if there were not enough evidence at that stage, 9 the events at the trial, including the
defendant's attempted suicide, were additional factors that required further inquiry into
the competence of the defendant58
trial and criminal responsibility. See Pate, 383 U.S. at 384 n.6.
37. See id. at 384.
38. See id. at 385. This was true notwithstanding a colloquy between the trial court and an
apparently lucid defendant. Relying on this interchange while ignoring "uncontradicted testimony" of a
"history of pronounced irrational behavior" was not justifiable, the Court concluded. Id. at 385-86.
39. See id. at 385.
40. 420 U.S. 162 (1974).
41. See id. at 163-64.
42. See id. at 164-65.
43. See id. at 180.
44. See id.
45. See id. at 178. Bizarre behavior at trial is no guarantee, however, of a determination of
incompetence. See id at 179; see also Addison v. Arkansas, 765 S.W.2d 566, 572 (Ark. 1989)
(providing that a defendant's increasingly psychotic behavior during his trial warranted an additional
examination, but not a finding of incompetence). Pate and Drope may be seen then as requiring that the
defendant's competence be addressed, not as setting forth the test for competence. That test was set forth
in Dusky. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
46. See Drope, 420 U.S. at 180.
47. Id.
48. IdU at 177.
49. A determination it declined to make. See id. at 177-78.
50. See id. at 178-79. The sentencing judge concluded that the suicide attempt indicated that the
1997]
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Thus, Drope expanded Pate by establishing that competence is an ongoing
requirement that poses a continuing obligation on the trial court to make further
inquiry and order an examination if the defendant's conduct during the trial raises a
bona fide doubt as to her competence. Further, it clarified that trial courts have an
obligation to "be alert" to any changes during trial that might render a defendant
incompetent.5
Thus, the basic tnets of competence to stand trial are well-settled. A defendant
must be competent, which means more than mere orientation as to time and place 2
To be competent, a defendant must possess the ability to assist counsel and have a
functional and rational understanding of the proceedings 3 Although a defendant's
competence can and perhaps should be raised by defense counsel,' there is a
discrete, independent requirement that the trial judge order an examination sua sponte
if there is doubt as to the defendant's competence. Moreover, this obligation does not
end when the trial commences; it continues throughout the proceeding and, indeed,
into sentencing 5
In more recent years, the Court has had the opportunity to refine the law of
competency. In Medina v. California,' the Court upheld a California statute that
placed upon the defendant the burden of proving incompetency, using the admittedly
narrow test for assessing due process challenges in criminal cases."1 The Court
declared that to place the burden on the defendant neither violated historical precepts
defendant had shot himself in an effort to avoid trial and, therefore, had "an awareness of what was going
on." Id. at 178-79.
51. Jd. at 181.
52. See Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960).
53. See id. Dusky has provided the test for competence for almost 40 years, but there have been
various attempts to amplify that test. See Wieter v. Settle, 193 F. Supp. 318, 321 (W.D. Mo. 1961)
(listing eight factors to be examined in assessing competency). In addition, some states list factors in
their statutes as well as decisional law. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2c:4-4 (West 1995); UTAH CODE ANN.'
§ 77-15-5 (1995); Nebraska v. Guatney, 299 N.W.2d 538, 543 (Neb. 1980). Mental health professionals
have developed their own assessment instruments as well. See HARVARD MEDICAL SCHOOL
LABORATORY OF COMMUNrY PSYCHIATRY FINAL REPORT, COMPETENCY To STAND TRIAL AND
MENTAL ILLNESS (1973).
54. But see Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in Representing the
Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of the Court, 1988 WiS. L. REV. 65 (1988).
Professor Uphoff challenges the notion found, among elsewhere, in the CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL
HEALTH STANDARDS (1989), that defense counsel has an obligation to raise the issue of her client's
competence. See id, at 67. Such a requirement, Uphoff asserts, compromises a defendant's right to
zealous advocacy. See k_1 at 89. Instead, he proposes that defense counsel be given the discretion to raise
the issue as she deems appropriate. See id. at 98.
55. See ARI7. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-4502 (West Supp. 1997); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,
405 (1986) (prohibiting the execution of an insane defendant); MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.04 (1980).
56. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
57. See id. at 446. In Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977), the Court underscored the
deference owed to states, in the "administration of justice" and declared that state criminal laws would
not be found in violation of the due process clause unless they offended "some principle of justice so
rooted in the traditions md conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental." Id. at 201-02. In
using the Patterson test, the Medina Court declined to adopt the three-part balancing test set forth in
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), that has been used in assessing civil due process claims.
[Vol. 50:495
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nor ran afoul of fundamental fairness 8 In reaching this conclusion, Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, observed that the entry of a plea of not guilty by reason of
insanity "presupposes that the defendant is competent to stand trial and to enter a
plea." 9 While this language is dicta, it is the Court's closest pronouncement on the
issue of competence as it relates to the insanity plea.'
In Godinez v. Moran,"' the Court tackled the issue of whether the standard of
competence necessary to plead guilty or waive the right to assistance of counsel was
the same as the standard of competence required to be tried. Before Godinez, several
circuits had held that a higher competence standard was necessary to plead guilty
because of the waiver of constitutional rights inherent in such a plea.' In its Godinez
opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit had required what
it believed to be a heightened standard: that the defendant have the ability to make a
"reasoned choice" from the various alternatives."
The United States Supreme Court reversed, concluding that the standard for
determining competence was identical in both circumstances." A criminal defendant
standing trial, the Court reasoned, is confronted with decisions similar in importance
to those required in determining whether to plead guilty or waive the right to
counsel.' Thus, it concluded, there was no need for a separate, higher standard for
the latter two decisions.
While rejecting the need for a higher standard for competence, the Godinez Court
stated that more than mere competence was required before a court may permit a
defendant to plead guilty or waive the right to counsel.' A defendant's waiver must
be knowing and voluntary.' The distinction drawn by the Court is that competence
involves the capacity to understand whereas the knowing and voluntary requirement
encompasses whether the defendant actually does understand."
58. See Medina, 505 U.S. at 446.
59. Id. at 449.
60. In Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705 (1962), the Court ruled on the consequences of a forced
insanity defense. See id. at 709-10; infra text accompanying notes 105-09.
61. 509 U.S. 389 (1992).
62. See Allard v. Helgemoe, 572 F.2d 1, 3-6 (1st Cir. 1978); United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d
721, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
63. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 397.
64. See id. at 402.
65. See id. at 398.
66. See id. at 399. Before reaching this conclusion, the Court mused whether there was even a
difference between a "rational understanding," the Dusky standard, and "reasoned choice," the standard
mandated by the Ninth Circuit. See id. at 398.
67. See id. at 400.
68. See id. The requirement that the waiver of constitutional rights be knowing and voluntary
appeared initially in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938). In Johnson, the Court held that, in order
to waive the Sixth Amendment right to counsel, the trial court must determine that a waiver of the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel is "intelligent and competent." Id. at 465.
69. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 401 n.12. Although the Godinez majority states that this knowing and
voluntary requirement is not a higher standard of competence, but a separate requirement, the notion of
"actual understanding" is not far from the multiple levels of decisional competence set forth by Professor
Bonnie. See Bonnie, supra note 17, at 570-76.
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Although Godinez did not mandate a higher degree of competence, the Court found
that more than competence was necessary, thus highlighting the significance of a
guilty plea. It affirms that not only must a defendant have the ability to understand
the proceedings, e.g., be competent, but she must also actually understand the import
of a particular decision and arrive at that decision in an atmosphere free of coercion.
Further, in a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy emphasized a point that he
believes underpins the law of competence: At common law there was a single
standard of competence that adhered throughout all stages of a criminal trial - from
arraignment through verdict.0 Kennedy cited with favor a commentator's view that
competence to stand trial has been traditionally presumed to include "competency to
participate in all phases of the trial process, including such pretrial activities as
deciding how to plead ....,,
Neither Godinez nor Medina directly address the issue at hand: the pretrial insanity
acquittal of an incompetent defendant. But a reading of Godinez suggests that
competence is required before any plea can be entered, presumably even a not guilty
by reason of insanity plea [hereinafter NGRI]. When this is coupled with the language
in the majority opinion in Medina "presupposing" that an NGRI plea can be entered
only by a competent defendant, one could surmise that the Court would find it
objectionable if an NGRI plea were interposed on behalf of a defendant who was
incapable of entering such a plea herself'
B. Practical Application
There are two conditions that invite the improper acquittal' of an incompetent
defendant. First, a single evaluation of the defendant's mental health that addresses
both issues of competence and responsibility. Second, a process by which the
conclusions of the evaluation are accepted without a trial.74 The following section
will set forth some of the practical components of the evaluation process.
In order to consider the defendant's mental state, a mental health evaluation may be
necessary.75 In some jurisdictions, an examination addressing the defendant's
competence to stand trial is ordered first so that issue may be resolved! 6 Thereafter,
70. See Godinez, 509 U.S. at 403.
71. Id. at 407 (quoting Weiner, supra note 27, at 695-96).
72. See Oregon v. Peterson, 689 P.2d 985, 991 (1984) (holding that competence to stand trial
includes competence to decide whether or not to plead the insanity defense). The issue of whether the
insanity defense can be forced on a defendant is a matter of some debate. See infra text accompanying
notes 105-20.
73. The term "improper acquittal" is used to denote those circumstances in which an incompetent
defendant is acquitted by reason of insanity. It is the premise of this article that it is unconstitutional to
render an acquittal in such a circumstance.
74. There are undoubtedly cases where an incompetent defendant is improperly taken to trial and
acquitted by reason of irsanity. Such an acquittal, however, is already prohibited by Drope v. Missouri,
420 U.S. 162, 181 (1975).
75. A mental examination to determine competence is one of several possible inquiries into the
criminal defendant's mertal state. Others include an assessment of the defendant's mental state at the time
of the crime. The results of that latter evaluation can be used to determine the defendant's criminal
responsibility, or can be used in a diminished capacity defense or as a mitigating factor at sentencing.
76. An evaluator's assessment as to competence is not dispositive. The court is required to make
[Vol. 50:495
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol50/iss4/3
1997] WHAT'S COMPETENCE GOT TO DO WITH IT
if the insanity defense is raised, another examination will occur 7 The Model Penal
Code 8 and several states," however, either require or permit that these issues be
handled jointly in a single mental health examination and report.
The issue of who raises questions about the defendant's mental health is complicated
in jurisdictions with a combined examination and report. All legal participants -judge,
prosecutor, as well as defense counsel - share an obligation to raise the competency
issue!' The insanity issue, on the other hand, is properly raised only by the defen-
dant."' Indeed, the Model Penal Code and several jurisdictions that provide for a
unitary examination on competence and responsibility permit the latter to be evaluated
as part of the examination only if the defense has raised an insanity plea.'
If the defendant is found incompetent, the state then has several options. Most
commonly, the defendant will be treated until she is "restored to competence," at
which point the criminal proceedings could resume.' Unlike the question of
competence, a court-ordered evaluation of the defendant's state of mind for the
purpose of pleading the insanity defense is not constitutionally mandated.'
the ultimate determination.
77. See IND. CODE ANN. § 35-36-3-1 (West 1986); Thx. CODE CRIM. P. ANN. art. 46.02(3), (4) &
46.03(3) (West 1979 & Supp. 1998). The Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards also provide for
separate evaluations. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-3.4 (1989).
78. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.05 (1980).
79. See ALA. CODE § 15-16-22 (1995); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-305 (Michie 1997); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 16-8-106 (1997); FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3-210; HAw. REV. STAT. § 704-404 (1993); LA. CODE CRIM.
PROC. ANN. art. 650 (West 1981); 01O REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.37.1 (Anderson 1996); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 13, § 4814 (Supp. 1997); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.060(3) (West 1990). New Hampshire
authorized joint evaluations in Novosel v. Helgemoe, 384 A.2d 124, 128 (N.H. 1978).
80. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 182 (1975). It may, however, be most difficult for defense
counsel to raise the competency issue consistent with other defense counsel responsibilities. See Uphoff,
supra note 54, at 97-98.
81. While there is no dispositive United States Supreme Court case on point, it is the author's
contention that the better position, supported by the weight of authority, is that the decision whether or
not to interpose the insanity defense rests solely within the defendant's control. See infra text
accompanying notes 105-20 (discussing the forced insanity defense).
82. See HAW. REV. STAT. § 704-404 (1993); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.77.060(3) (West 1990);
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.05 (1980). But see ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-305(a) (Michie 1997) (permitting
an examination if there is reason to believe that mental disease or defect will become an issue in the case
or there is reason to doubt defendant's fitness to proceed). The Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards
also permit the prosecution to request an independent psychiatric examination after the defendant has
given notice of her intent to use the defense. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS §
7-3.4 (1989).
83. Typically a finding of incompetence would result in a stay of the proceedings, pending the
defendant's restoration to competency. If the defendant cannot be restored to competence within a
reasonable period, then the state may keep her confined only if it can establish the grounds necessary
for civil commitment. Otherwise, she must be released. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 723-31
(1972). Jackson, however, does imply that, in the case of a permanently incompetent defendant,
proceedings that do not require the personal involvement of the defendant, e.g., discovery or motions to
dismiss, may go forward. See id. at 732-33. Numerous state statutes specifically provide for this option.
See, e.g., Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 7-11-303(j) (Michie 1997).
84. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 n.13 (1993). Indeed, Idaho, Kansas, Montana, and
Utah have abolished the insanity defense. Other states have adopted a guilty but mentally ill verdict. See
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Some jurisdictions,' however, follow the Model Penal Code and address both
competence and responsibility in one examination. Moreover, in some jurisdictions,
a court may accept the findings of the report without a hearing.' This procedure is
also permitted by the Model Penal Code.' It is in these jurisdictions that the problem
faced by our fictional defendant Scarlett Snopes is presented most squarely. If, by
statutory fiat, the evaluation may assess criminal responsibility as well as competence
and the results may be accepted through a report, then the circumstances are ripe for
an improper acquittal.
A trial of an incompetent defendant is constitutionally forbidden, even if an acquittal
by reason of insanity were inevitable." But in the jurisdictions where an acquittal
may occur based exclusively on the report of the evaluation performed on the
defendant, there may be a pretrial acquittal of an incompetent defendant.
It is not clear that the possibility of a pretrial acquittal by reason of insanity of an
incompetent defendant was intended by either the drafters of the Model Penal Code
or the various legislators who crafted statutes that create this outcome. More likely,
it is an unanticipated consequence as courts, lawyers, and mental health professionals
seek ways to handle these difficult cases. 9 Regardless of its origin, however, pretrial
acquittals of incompetent defendants do occur in violation of the same precepts that
render the trial of an incompetent defendant constitutionally infirm.
An acquittal by report heightens the possibilities for abuse. For instance, if the
acquittal is entered by report, without a hearing if none has been requested, it could
occur without the defendant being present. An acquittal without a hearing and in the
defendant's absence could result in the defendant's confusion about the process?'
J. Thomas Sullivan, P.rychiatric Defenses in Arkansas Criminal Trials, 48 ARK. L. REv. 439,447 (1995).
85. See supra note 79.
86. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.05 (1980).
87. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-313 (Michie 1997); HAw. REv. STAT. § 704-408 (1993).
88. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.07 (1980). This section provides that a court may, on motion from
the defendant, enter an r;cquittal based on the report by the court-ordered mental health professional
without a hearing, if non- is requested. See id.
89. In Coolbroth v. District Court, 766 P.2d 670 (Colo. 1988), the Colorado Supreme Court struck
down a statute permitting a trial of an incompetent defendant on the issue of insanity only. See id. at
671-73. The court stated that, even if the proceeding were to result in an insanity acquittal, the
adjudicatory process itself would be invalid. See id. at 671-72. Further, the court said that the statutory
provision that allowed the continuation of proceedings that could fairly occur without the defendant's
involvement "obviously" did not include insanity trials. Id. at 673. Note, however, that some jurisdictions
proceed with innocence-only hearings. In those jurisdictions, only a determination of innocence counts.
If the defendant is acquitted outright, or if the state cannot meet its burden, the criminal charges are
dismissed. If, however, an innocence-only hearing results in a conviction, that result is ignored and the
incompetent defendant is continued in treatment pending restoration of competency. See, e.g., DEL CODE
ANN. tit. 1I, § 404 (Supp. 1996); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-25 (West Supp. 1997); see also
Winick, supra note 10, at 576 (discussing when marginally competent defendants should be permitted
to proceed.) See infra text accompanying notes 228-41 for discussion of innocence-only hearings.
90. A less benign motive might also be imagined. Acquittals by report, even of incompetent
defendants, are an efficient way of disposing of these cases.
91. This would be particularly ironic in the case of an incompetent acquittee, since a component of
assessing competence is evaluating the defendant's comprehension of the court system. Having hearings
without the defendant present would understandably add to the defendant's confusion about the system.
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Further, the defendant's absence raises the possibility that the plea was interposed
without her knowledge or consent,
Ill. Is An Insanity Acquittal An Adverse Adjudication?
A. Adverse Consequences
"So what?" one might be inclined to ask, if our incompetent defendant Scarlett
Snopes has been acquitted by reason of insanity. Doesn't an insanity acquittal work
benefit rather than harm to an acquittee? Isn't Ms. Snopes better off with an insanity
acquittal than with being required to go through the process of being restored to
competence, being tried, and risking the possibility of conviction?
When the reality behind an acquittal by reason of insanity is exposed, it is clear that
Ms. Snopes is not necessarily better off. There are multiple adverse consequences to
a pretrial insanity acquittal. These include: the waiver of the constitutional rights
associated with a fair trial; the deprivation of liberty; the stigma of being found to be
mentally ill; and the invasive regimen of mental health treatment. Each of these
consequences will be examined in turn.
1. The Waiver of Constitutional Rights
a) General Considerations
The defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity and has that plea
accepted by a court waives constitutional rights associated with a fair trial. In some
jurisdictions, an uncontested plea means that the defendant is waiving, at a minimum,
her right to have the state prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt, and her right to
confront witnesses. The defendant may also be waiving the right to remain silent and
the right to a jury trial.'
An NGRI plea may also mean an admission of factual guilt In some jurisdic-
tions the defendant expressly relinquishes the right to challenge any detention
following the acquittal on the basis that she did not commit the acts.' Moreover, the
United States Supreme Court has said that an insanity acquittal includes a deter-
The author's experience in speaking to persons confined at a state hospital - who have either been
acquitted by reason of insanity or who are being "restored to competency" so that they may be tried -
is consistent with this supposition. When a client insists that she has never been to court, that may in
fact be true, even though she has been acquitted.
92. See Briggs v. Missouri, 509 S.W.2d 154 (Mo. Ct. App. 1974), where the court reversed an
insanity acquittal that occurred unbeknownst to the acquittee as he languished at a state hospital. See id.
at 156-57.
93. Set David S. Cohn, Offensive Use of the Insanity Defense: Imposing the Insanity Defense Over
the Defendant's Objection, 15 HASTiNGS CONsT. L.Q. 295, 295-96 (1988).
94. See Washington v. Brasel, 623 P.2d 696, 701 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981).
95. In Wisconsin, for example, a defendant who pleads not guilty by reason of insanity without
combining it with a not guilty plea admits that, but for the lack of mental capacity, she committed all
the essential elements of the crime charged. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.06(1)(d) (West 1985).
96. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.77.080 (West 1990). In Novosel v. Helgemoe, 384 A.2d 124
(N.H. 1978), the New Hampshire Supreme Court stated that an insanity plea "is one of confession and
avoidance and admits that the defendant committed the acts alleged." Id. at 128.
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mination of factual guilt. In Jones v. United States, the Court specifically said that
an acquittal by reason of insanity establishes that the act actually occurred!' Indeed,
it was exactly the defendant's committing of the criminal act - shoplifting in the case
of Mr. Jones - that allowed the Court to find the element of dangerousness necessary
to confine Mr. Jones to a mental institution.? The Court declared that "[a] verdict of"
not guilty by reason of insanity establishes two facts: (i) the defendant committed an
act that constitutes a criminal offense, and (ii) he committed the act because of mental
illness."'"9
The Jones Court said that it was this difference - the commission of the
offense - that distinguished Jones from Jackson v. Indiana,' which precluded the
long-term confinement in a mental institution of an incompetent accused." In
Jackson, an indefinite pretrial commitment based solely on the need to restore an
incompetent defendant to competency was held to be impermissible because the nature
and duration of the commitment did not bear a reasonable relationship to its
purpose." In Jones, however, the possibly lifelong commitment was found to be
consistent with due process principles because, after an insanity acquittal, a court could
safely conclude thar a criminal act had been committed and that, therefore, the
acquittee was dange..ous l°
b) Forcing the Insanity Plea
There has not been a dispositive United States Supreme Court decision on the issue
of whether a court or defense counsel has an obligation - or a right - to interpose
the insanity defense against a defendant's wishes. The Court's contribution is found
in Lynch v. Overhoser0 where the Court interpreted a District of Columbia statute
to mean that a defendant may not be automatically committed to an institution
following an insanity acquittal if the insanity defense had been imposed upon that
defendant." Instead, the trial court is required to use civil commitment procedures
to confine and trez.t an acquittee whose insanity acquittal was contrary to her
wishes."9
In order to reach its decision, the Lynch Court had to accept the premise that a
forced insanity defense was possible." But the import of Lynch should not be
overstated; it is best read as a statutory case. Indeed, the Court explicitly said it did
not have to reach tha constitutional issue. 9
97. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
98. See ictL at 363.
99. See iL at 364.
100. Id. at 363.
101. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
102. See id. at 720.
103. See id. at 730, 738.
104. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 364.
105. 369 U.S. 705 (1962).
106. See id, at 719.
107. See id. at 720.
108. See id. at 719.
109. See id. at 709-10. The dissent took issue with this view, accusing the majority of rendering
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In Frendak v. United States,"' a case that has enjoyed wide influence,"' the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals declared that a competent defendant's decision
to reject the insanity defense was binding, provided that the decision was made
intelligently and voluntarily."' Further, the court stated that a declaration of a
defendant's competence was not sufficient; the trial court must inquire further to gauge
whether the decision was intelligent and voluntary."'
In explaining why a decision to plead insanity was so fundamental as to require
deference to a defendant's choice, the Frendak court pointed to several factors: the
imposition of a term of confinement exceeding that which could be imposed after a
conviction; the invasive nature of psychiatric care and treatment that would occur
following a criminal commitment; a legitimate desire to avoid the stigma of an
insanity label; the admission of factual guilt that accompanies an insanity acquittal;
and the potential for negative collateral consequences flowing from an insanity
acquittal, e.g., the right to vote, to drive, or to carry a weapon."4 More recently, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has come to the
same conclusion. In United States v. Marble,"5 the court reversed long-standing
precedent by concluding that the decision to plead insanity is within the control of the
defendant."6
Not all courts have followed this line of reasoning. Illinois courts, for instance, have
determined that the insanity defense is simply a defense which, like other defenses,
rests with the control of counsel."7 Courts have also wrestled with the intelligent and
voluntary components added in Frendak. While finding Frendak "largely persuasive,"
one court cautioned against turning the inquiry of whether the waiver is intelligent and
a constitutional holding dressed up in statutory clothes. See id. at 733 (Clark, J., dissenting).
110. 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1979).
111. See Cohn, supra note 93, at 298.
112. See Frendak, 408 A.2d at 380.
113. See id.
114. See id. at 376-77. With the "reform" in the area of the rights of the mentally ill, there have
been attempts to lessen the collateral consequences and/or legal stigma associated with a mental illness
adjudication. Even if that effort has achieved some level of success, criminal acquittees are still treated
quite differently from civil committees and that differential treatment has been sanctioned by courts on
numerous occasions. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 370 (1983) (declaring that its ruling
"accords with the widely and reasonably held view that insanity acquittees constitute a special class that
should be treated differently from other candidates for commitment.").
115. 940 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
116. See id. at 1548; see also Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1965), overruled
by United States v. Marble, 940 F.2d 1543 (D.C. Cir. 1991). The Marble court reasoned that Whalem
was in "tension" with the principles set forth in North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) and Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), two cases that increased a competent defendant's right to set the
course of his own defense. See Marble, 940 F.2d at 1546. Further, the court relied on congressional
enactment of the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C § 17 (1994). The IDRA made the
insanity plea an affirmative defense and, thus, according to the Marble court, the plea is now
indistinguishable from the type of defense decisions that Faretta mandates be within a defendant's
control. See Marble, 940 F.2d at 1547.
117. See Illinois v. Anderson, 641 N.E.2d 591, 600 (111. App. Ct. 1994).
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voluntary into a second competency hearing."' In that case, the court determined
that although the defendant was delusional, his waiver of the insanity defense was
valid."9 Similarly, the Vermont Supreme Court refused to adopt Frendak's reasoning
to require a trial cout inquiry into whether a defendant, who had initially interposed
the insanity defense, later made a knowing and voluntary waiver.'
The views expressed by the Marble and Frendak courts, that a competent defendant
controls the decision of whether to plead insanity, are consistent with the premise that
an incompetent defendant ought not be acquitted by reason of insanity. The
consequences of such an acquittal are significant and should be borne only by a
competent defendant who has sought such a result after a knowing and intelligent
waiver of constitutional rights.
2. Deprivation of Liberty
An insanity acquittee may be constitutionally confined for a term far in excess of
that which would have been meted out for criminal punishment. 2' In Jones v.
United States," Michael Jones was charged with the misdemeanor of petit larceny
for shoplifting a jacket from a department store. The maximum punishment, if
convicted, was a one-year sentence. He was acquitted by reason of insanity and was
sent to St. Elizabeth Hospital, an institution for persons with mental illness in the
District of Columbia. Mr. Jones sought release after he had been there more than one
year.
After his application for discharge was denied, Mr. Jones challenged the statutory
provisions, asserting that to keep him longer than he could have been imprisoned was
to work a violation of his due process rights as specified in Addington v. Texas.
Jones argued that since the length of time for which he could have been sentenced
was over, he could be involuntarily confined only if the standards for civil commit-
ment, as articulated in Addington, were met."
First, the Jones Court found that an acquittal by reason of insanity established that
the acquittee was both presently mentally ill and dangerous, the two elements
118. See New Jersey v. Cecil, 616 A.2d 1336, 1344 (N.J. 1992).
119. See id. at 1344.
120. See Vermont v. Davignon, 565 A.2d 1301, 1305-08 (Vt. 1989).
121. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368 (1983). Studies juxtaposing hospital
confinements for acquittees with prison sentences for those convicted of similar crimes have yielded
conflicting results. Some have found acquittees remain confined longer, others find the period of
deprivation of liberty to be relatively equal and others still show that acquittees spend less time confined.
See Silver, supra note 15, at 377.
122. 463 U.S. 354 (1983).
123. 441 U.S. 418 (1979). In Addington, the Supreme Court held that, in order to civilly commit
someone, the state must prove by clear and convincing evidence that a person is mentally ill and a
danger to herself or other. See id. at 433. The substantive standard of danger to self or others was set
forth in O'Connor v. Dorialdson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1980). Although states have variations upon the
theme, the basic standard is similar from state to state. There has, however, been a move in recent years
to loosen the standard. Hawaii, for instance, permits commitment for persons who are "obviously ill."
HAW. REv. STAT. ANN. § 334-59(a)(3)(b) (Michie 1993 & Supp. 1996).
124. A key benefit to the use of the Addington principles would be to switch the burden to the state.
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necessary in Addington to support involuntary commitment.'21 Next, the Court
rejected the argument that, because insanity only need be proven by a preponderance
of the evidence, the burden of proof was wanting under Addington, which mandated
a clear and convincing standard for civil commitment.'" The Court cited to reasons
why the higher Addington burden of proof was unnecessary. First, the acquittee could
be automatically committed'" only if she had raised the insanity defense." Thus,
the Court reasoned, if the defendant had raised the defense, then the risk of error that
the defendant was not mentally ill was minimized.'" Second, proof of the criminal
act inherent in the acquittal obviated the concern of an individual being
institutionalized for merely bizarre or idiosyncratic behavior, one reason why the
Addington Court had mandated a higher burden in civil commitment cases.'"
The Jones Court further found "irrelevant" the length of the criminal sentence that
would or could have been imposed were there a conviction.'3' A criminal sentence,
the Court said, is a means of punishment, which is not a valid concern for a criminal
acquittee.'32 The acquittee's confinement rests solely on her "continuing illness and
dangerousness."'3 Thus, Jones clearly establishes that an acquittee may be held until
she has "regained [her] sanity or is no longer a danger to [herself] or society," without
any reference to what the criminal sentence would have been.'" In view of this
consequence, it seems axiomatic that to impose this potentially lifelong confinement
upon an incompetent defendant is as constitutionally repugnant as is -forcing an
incompetent defendant to go to trial.
The deprivation of liberty is especially onerous because once one is confined in the
post-acquittal system it is difficult to secure release. Unlike many prison sentences,
an insanity acquittee's confinement is indefinite; it lasts until she is no longer mentally
ill and dangerous. This is so because an acquittee is ostensibly confined for the
protection of society and for her own treatment.'35 Even the involuntary civil
commitment of a person, which is also for the dual purposes of protection and
treatment, generally lasts only for a finite period.'" Further, in a civil commitment,
125. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 362-63.
126. See id. at 366-68.
127. Automatic commitment means the acquitted defendant, now the "acquittee," is sent to a mental
health institution automatically upon the acquittal, without any need for further findings by the court.
This is one of several options at the time of an insanity acquittal. Others include a requirement of new
findings by the court as to the acquittee's dangerousness and mental illness as a factual predicate to
commitment, commencement of civil commitment or guardianship proceedings, and outright release.
128. See id. at 367; see also Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 709-10 (1962) (holding that an
automatic commitment was permissible only if the defendant had raised the insanity defense).
129. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 367.
130. See id. at 367.
131. Id. at 369.
132. See id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 370.
135. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 75-76 (1992).
136. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 20-47-214 & 20-47-215 (Michie 1991).
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the state would have the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence'" that
the defendant is mentally ill and not harmless." Once the defendant is committed
as a result of an insanity acquittal, however, the burden may permissibly shift to her
to prove that she is no longer mentally ill or no longer dangerous.'
This is a difficult burden to sustain where the acquittee is unlikely to have ready
access to - or funds to retain - the kind of expert witnesses needed to counteract
the hospital's testimony." Nor will the acquittee necessarily have the right to
counsel to assist in pursuing release. 4' Although the acquittee may have a right to
request a periodic release hearing," she may not have access to counsel or other
knowledge of that right. Finally, even if the acquittee is released, the release may be
a conditional discharge, resulting in continued restrictions on liberty that could extend
throughout the acquittee's lifetime.43
3. Stigma
The third adverse consequence to an insanity acquittal is the stigma of being labeled
insane. The pernicious nature of the mental illness label is well established. The
United States Supreme Court has addressed the issue of stigma on various occasions.
In Addington v. Texas," the Court said that "[a]n involuntary commitment... can
engender adverse social consequences . . . .Whether we label this phenomenon
'stigma! or choose to call it something else is less important than that we recognize
137. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 432-33 (1979).
138. See O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576 (1975) (requiring proof of these factors or some
variation thereof).
139. Some states and the Model Penal Code shift the burden. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-315
(Michie 1997); MO. STAT. ANN. § 522.040 (West Supp. 1998); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08(2).
The two Supreme Court cases addressing post-acquittal issues, Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354
(1983), and Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992), do not specifically rule on whether a state may
make an acquittee seeking release prove that she is neither dangerous nor mentally ill. In Jones, however,
the Court stated that an acquittee was not entitled to the same constitutional protections as a civil
committee. See Jones, 463 U.S. at 367-68.
140. It is a safe legal proposition that if an acquittee is filing for release, the hospital or institution
will be opposing it. If the hospital believes that the acquittee can safely be released, then generally it has
the obligation to seek discharge on behalf of the acquittee. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-315 (Michie
1997); MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.08 (1980). Of course, it is quite possible that if the acquittee sought
release, the institution rnght "suddenly" realize that the acquittee is either no longer dangerous or
mentally ill or that she can be released at least conditionally.
141. While some stafes do provide the right to counsel, see ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-315 (Michie
1997); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10-77-020 (West 1990 & Supp. 1997), it may not be a constitutional
right. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790 (1973) (holding that there is not a per se right to
counsel in a probation revocation hearing).
142. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-315 (Michie 1997). In Jones, the Court sanctioned an
indeterminate commitmert but noted the periodic judicial hearing that allows a court to assess an
acquittee's "suitability for release." Jones, 463 U.S. at 368.
143. Some jurisdicticns limit the conditions of release to a specific term of years. See, e.g., ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-2-316 (hMichie 1997). Others, however, consider conditions lifelong, a consequence
sanctioned by the United States Supreme Court in Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 368-69 (1983).
144. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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that it can occur and that it can have a very significant impact on the individual."14
In identifying the prejudice and stigma attached to the mentally ill, the Court, in
O'Connor v. Donaldson,"M said:
May the State fence in the harmless mentally ill solely to save its citizens
from exposure to those whose ways are different? One might as well ask
if the State, to avoid public unease, could incarcerate all who are
physically unattractive or socially eccentric. Mere public intolerance or
animosity cannot constitutionally justify the deprivation of a person's
physical liberty."
Although Addington and O'Connor are civil commitment cases, the stigma issue
applies with equal or greater force to the mentally ill involved in the criminal justice
system. They will be subject to the collective opprobrium heaped upon two
stigmatized groups: the criminal and the mentally ill. Of these two groups, it is hard
to know who is vilified and marginalized more, but it is a fair guess that the com-
bination is deadly; the Hollywood stereotype of the psychotic killer is pervasive and
powerful. "  The common perception of the criminal trying to beat the system by
feigning mental illness is an additional stigma likely to be attached to the insanity
acquittee1
49
Lest one doubt the potentially severe adverse consequences of involuntary
placement in a mental health facility, the United States Supreme Court has declared
that being placed in a mental health facility is worse than being placed in a prison."50
In Vitek v. Jones,' the Court held that even a prisoner has a protected liberty
interest implicated by a forced transfer to a mental hospital." In so finding, the
Court explicitly recognized the stigmatizing effects of a "mental illness" label even on
one who already wears the moniker of "convict."'"
The Vitek Court declared that a prisoner's liberty interest is in neither freedom from
confinement nor a change in the terms of confinement, even if substantially
adverse." Rather, it is the diagnosis of mental illness, followed by forced mental
145. Id. at 425-26.
146. 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
147. id. at 575.
148. The character Hannibal Lechter in Silence of the Lambs is one example; Norman Bates of
Psycho fame another. See generally John Kip Cornwell, Confining the Mentally Disordered "Super
Criminals". A Realignment of Rights for the Nineties, 33 Hous. L. REv. 651, 663-64 (1996) (positing
that insanity acquittees are uniquely disadvantaged "super criminals' who, through the unfortunate fusion
of prior mental illness and criminal activity, face a greater risk of long-term deprivation of liberty than
their noncriminal or nonmentally disordered counterparts"). In Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364,
377 (D.C. 1979), the court stated that insanity acquittees may well view themselves as "twice cursed."
149. See, e.g., California v. Vanley, 41 Cal. Rptr. 446, 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974) (discussing the
possibility of defendants trying to "beat the rap").
150. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 492-93 (1980).
151. 445 U.S. 480 (1980).
152. See id. at 48788.
153. See id. at 492-93.
154. See id. at 493.
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health treatment, that constitutes additional infringement on liberty that require further
due process protections for the prisoner."5 The Court specifically cited the stigma
and forced behavior modification programs as deprivations of liberty."
4. Invasion of Privacy and Loss of Autonomy
An insanity acquittal often leads to commitment to a state hospital. Although it is
a mental institution, not a prison, ostensibly for the purpose of treatment rather than
punishment, the difference between the two may not be so readily apparent to the
confined individual. On the other hand, the differences might be quite obvious and the
individual may prefer prison. The behavior modification system cited in Vitek and
used in other states" certainly restricts more than the acquittee's liberty: her personal
behavior and choices are also limited, scrutinized, and judged. Acknowledging this
level of intrusion, th- District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in Frendak v. United
States," cited the invasive nature of psychiatric treatment as one of the reasons why
a defendant might decline to pursue an insanity defense.'
B. Court Responses
Courts that have confronted the issue of the effects of an insanity acquittal have
explicitly acknowledged the adverse consequences that attach and have tailored the
manner in which they handle these cases accordingly."w The courts that have
considered the issue have required some kind of conversation between the trial court
and the defendant.'
155. See id. at 493-94.
156. See id. at 494.
157. Arkansas, for instance, has a program for insanity acquittees that involves an elaborate five-
tiered behavior modification program. One must successfully complete one level before progressing to
the next and must complete all five before being recommended for release. Woe to the acquittee who
would rather not have her behavior modified. This is all done, of course, in the name of treatment and
safety, as punishment is not a legitimate goal for an insanity acquittee. See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504
U.S. 71, 80 (1992) (stating that an insanity acquittee has not been convicted and therefore may not be
punished).
158. 408 A.2d 364 (D.C. 1979).
159. See id at 376.
160. The fact that colateral attacks on acquittals by reason of insanity are filed by acquittees many
years after their sentence would have been completed if they had been convicted is stark testimony to
the adverse consequences of an insanity acquittal. See generally Walls v. United States, 601 A.2d 54
(D.C. 1991) (addressing rcquittee's challenge of his 1974 acquittal for simple assault).
161. In some jurisdictions, even for uncontested pleas, the court hears a prosecutorial proffer or
accepts stipulated facts that the act was committed by the defendant. See Legrand v. United States, 570
A.2d 786, 788 (D.C. 1990). Thereafter, the court conducts a colloquy with the defendant to ascertain that
she understands the consti-utional rights being waived by an insanity plea. See Morrison v. United States,
579 A.2d 686, 692 (D.C. 1990). In Colorado, the court must, pursuant to statute, advise the defendant
as to the consequences of an insanity plea at the time the plea is entered. See CoLO. REv. STAT. § 16-8-
103(4) (1996). In jurisdictions where these colloquies occur, a defendant would obviously have to be
competent before such a discussion is undertaken.
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In Legrand v. United States," for instance, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals reversed a trial judge who had not adequately apprised a defendant of the
consequences that could arise after an acquittal by reason of insanity." To enter an
insanity plea, the court said, is "not a trivial thing."TM In Legrand, the defendant was
still confined in an institution for the mentally ill some eleven years after he would
have been eligible for parole had he been found guilty. The court, after ack-
nowledging the difficulty in explaining the consequences of an acquittal by reason of
insanity to a defendant qualified to plead it, nonetheless decreed that "since the
defendant may lose his liberty for a very long time, thoroughness and meticulousness
are essential if the uninformed relinquishment of constitutionally protected liberty
interests is to be avoided."'TM
The Legrand court declared that the judge-defendant colloquy that occurs pursuant
to a guilty plea should occur in this instance as well." Not only must the trial court
address the defendant personally to ensure that she understands the maximum possible
consequences, the judge must be confident that the defendant has a meaningful
comprehension of them." Under this approach, the defendant would not only need
to be competent but would need more - something akin to the knowing and
voluntariness that was deemed necessary to accompany a guilty plea or waiver of right
to counsel in Godinez v. Moran.TM
Courts in Wisconsin, Washington, California, and Florida have imposed similar
requirements on courts accepting insanity pleas. In Wisconsin v. Shegrud,'" the
Wisconsin Supreme Court analogized an NGRI plea to a plea of no contest, rather
than a plea of guilty."m The court stated that a defendant who enters such a plea was
admitting to committing the elements of the crime, though lacking the mental
capacity.'"' Further, the court explicitly stated that a defendant who entered such a
plea was waiving constitutional rights and, accordingly, the waiver must be both
162. 570 A.2d 786 (D.C. 1990).
163. See id. at 794.
164. Id. at 792.
165. Id. The court's assertion that it would be difficult to have a colloquy with a defendant pleading
insanity may suggest confusion between competence and responsibility. The defendant would have to
be competent to enter the plea, but that would have no bearing on the defendant's mental state at the time
of the crime.
166. See id. at 792-93. That colloquy generally consists of the judge, in open court, addressing the
defendant to ascertain, inter alia, whether the defendant understands the nature of the charge, the possible
penalties, the right to counsel, the right to plead or go to trial, and the right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses. The judge must also be certain that the plea is being offered voluntarily and free of
coercion. See FED. R. CRIM. P. lId.
167. See Legrand, 570 A.2d at 792.
168. 509 U.S. 389, 396 (1993).
169. 389 N.W.2d 7 (Wis. 1986).
170. See id. at 9.
171. See id. Under Wisconsin's statutory scheme, a plea of not guilty by reason of mental disease
or defect may be joined with a plea of not guilty. If it is not, a plea of not guilty by reason or mental
disease or defect involves a direct confession of factual guilt. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 971.06(l)(d) (West
1985).
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knowing and voluntary to be constitutionally sound."n In both Legrand and Shegrud,
the courts concluded that the trial court must personally address the defendant to
ensure that the plea is made knowingly and voluntarily."
In Washington v. Brasel74 the Washington Court of Appeals reasoned that, for
due process purposes, an insanity plea was the substantive equivalent to a guilty
plea." The court relied on the United States Supreme Court decision in Boykin v.
Alabama, 76 among other cases, to hold that in order for the plea to be valid, it must
be shown that the defendant knew the nature of the charges against him, as well as
their consequences, and knew that he was waiving a series of constitutional rights."
This is so, the court declared, because in pleading insanity, the defendant is admitting
he committed the act and if his plea is accepted, he is waiving his right to a jury trial
and to confront his accusers.178
In California v. 1'anley,"7 the California Court of Appeals reversed an acquittal
by reason of insanity after finding that the plea had been entered by defense counsel,
not by the defendant himself." Further, the court continued, even if the defendant
had properly made the plea himself, it was reversible error for the defendant not to be
told by the court that a possible lifelong commitment could ensue.' Indeed, the
court found this information to be more critical here than after a guilty plea, where the
defendant would expect a period of confinement as punishment." With a candid
nod towards the use of the insanity defense as way to "beat the rap," the court said
it was important that such a defendant know the possibilities that may await him after
the successful insanity acquittal."
172. See Shegrud, 389 N.W.2d at 9.
173. See Legrand, 570 A.2d at 793; Shegrud, 389 N.W.2d at 9.
174. 623 P.2d 696 (Wash. Ct. App. 1981)
175. See id. at 701-C2. The Court of Appeals of Washington has, in a subsequent case, highlighted
some of the differences between a guilty plea and an insanity plea, citing prominently that it is a finding
of not guilty and preclues the possibility of punishment by imprisonment. See Washington v. Autrey,
794 P.2d 81, 83 (Wash. Ct. App. 1990). Other jurisdictions, such as Washington D.C., have found that,
for the purposes of a knowing and voluntary colloquy, an insanity plea parallels a guilty plea. See
Legrand, 570 A.2d at 794.
176. 395 U.S. 238 (1969). In Boykin, the Court held that a guilty plea, which involves the waiver
of at least three constitutional rights - the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial,
and the right to confront one's accusers - must be entered knowingly and voluntarily. See id. at 242-43.
The Court refused to presume a waiver from a silent record, adding that a judge who ensures that a
defendant has a full understanding of the consequences will do so in a way that leaves an adequate
record for review. See id. at 244.
177. See Brasel, 623 P.2d at 701.
178. See id.
179. 116 Cal. Rptr. 446 (Ct. App. 1974).
180. See id. at 452.
181. See idt
182. See id. at 453.
183. See id. That view was reiterated in California v. Lomboy, 171 Cal. Rptr. 812 (Cal. Ct. App.
1981), where the court reversed an insanity acquittal because the defendant had not been advised of the
possibility of a lifelong commitment. See id. at 813. After determining that the defendant had been
properly advised of the potential 6f remaining in a mental institution for the rest of her life when initially
pleading not guilty by reason of insanity, the court found reversible error in the failure to readvise the
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In each of the above cases, the courts have required that a defendant enter an NGRI
plea with the knowing and voluntariness required when constitutional rights are being
waived. Moreover, the courts also cited the potentially lengthy confinement as a
reason to mandate a colloquy with the defendant to ensure that she is aware of the
adverse consequence of an insanity plea' 4 Although not explicitly addressed, each
of the decisions has as a factual predicate a competent defendant, as an incompetent
defendant could not knowingly and voluntarily waive rights or have a discussion with
the court. Indeed, in each of these circumstances, a competent defendant would be a
constitutional requirement."s
In Harringer v. Florida," the Florida District Court of Appeal directly addressed
the need for a competent defendant for an acquittal by reason of insanity. In reversing
a trial court's refusal to set aside an acquittal by reason of insanity, the appellate court
first found fault with the lack of evidence that the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his right to a jury trial.'" More importantly, however, the court
found constitutional offense in the absence of evidence that the defendant was
competent." The record showed only that the state's attorney and the defense
counsel stipulated to the entry of an NGRI plea. "Good intentions do not override
constitutional rights," the court declared, finding that the defendant's due process rights
were violated when the proceedings continued in light of reasonable grounds to
suspect the defendant's incompetency."
IV. Model Code and ABA Standards
Neither the Model Penal Code nor the Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards
explicitly address the issue of whether an incompetent defendant may be acquitted by
reason of insanity in a pretrial procedure. Each of these sets of model provisions,
however, contains sections that inform the discussion.
A. Model Penal Code
Section 4 of the Model Penal Code deals with the defendant's responsibility."9
Section 4.03 provides that the defense of lack of capacity due to mental disease or
defect9 is an affirmative defense."~ It bars the consideration of the defense if it
defendant after she had been convicted of factual guilt and was before the court in the sanity phase of
the proceeding. See id at 815-16.
184. See Legrand v. United States, 570 A.2d 786, 794 (D.C. 1990); Vanley, 116 Cal. Rptr. at 452.
185. See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 398-403 (1993) (explaining the standard of competency
required to plead guilty); Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969) (holding that a waiver of
constitutional rights must be knowing and voluntary).
186. 566 So. 2d 893 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
187. See id. at 894.
188. See id.
189. Jd. at 894.
190. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4 (1980).
191. The MODEL PENAL CODE also refers to this as the defense of irresponsibility. See id. § 4.05(3).
192. See id. § 4.3.
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is raised by the prcsecution or on the court's own motion.'" The rationale behind
this prohibition, the comment suggests, is that despite the advantages of letting a trial
court impose the insanity defense upon a defendant who forbids her lawyer to plead
it, such a rule would interfere too significantly with the handling of the defense.'"
Thus, under the Model Penal Code, only a defendant can interpose this defense. It is
reasonable, therefore, to conclude that the code drafters would require that a defendant
must be competent to choose this defense.'
Section 4.05 of the Model Penal Code specifies the procedures by which an
examination is obtained when a defendant's mental health is at issue. By mandating
that there be a single examination when "the defendant has filed a notice of intention
to rely on the defen.e of mental disease or defect excluding responsibility, or there is
reason to doubt his fitness to proceed... [,]"'9 it "avoids the duplication"'" when
separate examinations are ordered for competency and responsibility. This section
provides that the examiner shall file a report addressing the defendant's capacity to
understand the proceedings and to assist in his own defense and, after the appropriate
notice has been tendered by the defendant, an opinion as to the defendant's
responsibility.'"
This provision of the Model Penal Code - which combines the assessment of the
defendant's present capacity to proceed with an assessment of whether the defendant
meets the elements of the insanity defense - unwittingly creates the condition for an
insanity acquittal of an incompetent defendant. If the assessments were kept separate,
then an incompetent defendant's lack of fitness to stand trial would be addressed and
resolved before an examination on the question of responsibility. '" Although the
Model Penal Code itself calls for a suspension of the proceedings if the defendant is
found not fit to proceed,'w a report finding a defendant incompetent and not
responsible could nonetheless be filed and accepted by the court, without the court
taking the further s;tep of suspending the proceedings and having the defendant
restored to competence. The result would thus be an insanity acquittal before the
defendant's competence is resolved.
A single report that addresses both competence and responsibility is usually only
the first step in arriving at an improperly acquitted incompetent defendant. The next
193. See id. § 4.03(2) explanatory note at 222.
194. See id. § 4.03(2) cmt. at 229.
195. Prohibiting the court or the prosecution from raising the insanity defense is an effective shield
against the wrongful acquittal of a defendant. If this provision of the Model Penal Code always
accompanied the provision that allows responsibility and competency to be examined together, it would
at least ensure that defense counsel, if not the defendant herself, favored an insanity acquittal.
196. Id. § 4.05(1).
197. Id. § 4.05 cmt. at 234.
198. See id. § 4.05(3).
199. This is so because, if the defendant were to be found incompetent or not fit to proceed, the
issue of guilt or innocence would be set aside until such time that the defendant was restored to
competency. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 732 (1972). The exceptions to this general rule are
the few jurisdictions that have prima facie or innocence-only hearings. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §
404 (Supp. 1996); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/104-25 (West 1997).
200. See MODEL PrNAL CODE § 4.06(2) (1980).
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component may be a statutory provision that permits an insanity acquittal based on a
report. Such a pretrial acquittal is not specifically addressed in the United States
Supreme Court cases proscribing the trial and conviction of an incompetent defendant.
Those cases, understandably, have focused on the trial and conviction of an
incompetent defendant, not on her pretrial acquittal."' The statutory language
permitting acquittal by report is found in sections 4.06 and 4.07 of the Model Penal
Code and in several states.'
The language in the Model Penal Code is crafted in a way that, if adopted verbatim
and followed precisely, would not permit a wrongful acquittal. Section 4.06 specifies
that if a defendant is found not fit to proceed, either based on the report or after an
evidentiary hearing if necessary, the proceedings are to be suspended.' Accordingly,
the ability of the court to acquit based on the report as allowed in section 4.07 would
be limited to circumstances in which the defendant's competency was already resolved.
Thus, the Model Penal Code drafters wisely separated a trial courfs consideration of
these distinct determinations even though they combined the psychiatric assessment
thereof.
The Model Penal Code does permit certain legal activity to continue even in the
face of an incompetent defendant.' Section 4.06(3) permits defense counsel to raise
legal objections that do not require the personal participation of defendant. The
comment to Section 4.06(3) notes that "it seemed consonant with fairness to dismiss
unwarranted charges against an unfit defendant."' 0
The Model Penal Code also has an alternate subsection that permits an incompetent
defendant to seek a special post-commitment hearing at which the prosecution would
be required to put forth a prima facie case, the absence of which would require
dismissal.' This procedure parallels the concept of an innocence-only hearing found
in the Criminal Justice Standards.
B. ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards
1. Overview
The ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards (hereinafter Mental Health
Standards) are a relatively new contribution to the field. First appearing in 1986 as a
chapter in the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, the Mental Health Standards were
subsequently expanded and are now a separate volume containing ninety-six
standards.'
201. See Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975); Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375,384 (1966).
202. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-313 (Michie 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.020 (West Supp. 1997).
203. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06 (1) (1980). There are exceptions to this suspension. See supra
text accompanying notes 172-76, 188-91 (discussing those exceptions).
204. See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 740, 741 (1972) (discussing procedures that may go
forward notwithstanding the defendant's incompetence).
205. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06(3) cmt. (1980).
206. See i.
207. See infra text accompanying notes 228-41.
208. See CRIMINAL JUsTICE MENTAL HEALTh STANDARDS xv (1989).
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The Mental Health Standards contain many sections pertinent to this discussion.
Sections 7-3.1 through 3.15 deal generally with pretrial evaluations and expert
testimony. Of particular interest is section 7-3.5(c), which discourages combining
evaluation of the defendant's competence to stand trial with an assessment of
defendant's mental state at the time of the crime.' This would be allowed, the
section provides, only if requested by defendant or if ordered "for good cause
shown."21 The commentary to this rule suggests that its purpose is to prevent the
professional misapprehension that occurs when evaluators and courts confuse the
issues of competence and responsibility"
The adoption of this standard would go a long way towards eliminating improper
acquittals since a single report that recites findings on both of these issues creates the
problem. Further, one might suspect that commentators are correct in suggesting that
the root of the problem is professional confusion!" By separating out the inquiries,
the chances for confusion and resultant error would be reduced.
The possibility that a pretrial acquittal of an incompetent defendant is intentional
rather than accidentad cannot be overlooked. A judge may see a report that indicates
that a defendant is both incompetent and not responsible and conclude that everyone
profits by an acquittal at that point.213 If the defendant's incompetence were resolved
first, as it should be, then the defendant would not go to trial and will probably be
committed until competence is restored. A judge could decide to simply skip that step
and acquit the defendant, after which the defendant would usually be confined. Thus,
the argument goes, everyone is saved the hassle of another proceeding and the
defendant gets the help she needs.
Facially attractive though it may be, this argument is fundamentally flawed. First
and foremost, the system may be wrongfully acquitting by reason of insanity a person
who ought to be acquitted outright because she did not commit the crime. But as long
as the defendant remains incompetent, she would not be able to assist in her defense
and provide her attorney the very information needed to obtain an acquittal. So, the
step of restoring competence is integral to assuring the accuracy of the criminal justice
system.2 Moreover, even if the defendant did in fact commit the acts that constitute
the crime, then it still should be her choice whether or not to avail herself of the
insanity defense. She should be able to decide whether she prefers the potential
consequences of an insanity acquittal to those of a conviction.
209. See id § 7-6.1 ("The defense of mental nonresponsibility [insanity]").
210. Id. § 7-3.5(c), at 97.
211. See CRIMINAL JUsTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-3.5 cmt. at 98.
212. See HARvARD MEDICAL SCHOOL LABORATORY OF COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY FINAL REPORT,
COMPETENCY To STAND TRIAL AND MENTAL ILLNESs 1 (1974).
213. The prosecutor and defense counsel could also reach the same conclusion and suggest
immediate acquittal to the court.
214. The integrity of the system is one of the reasons historically given for prohibiting the trial of
an incompetent person. See supra notes 27-28 and accompanying text.
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2. Competence to Stand Trial
Sections 7-4.1 through 7-4.15 of the Mental Health Standards address sundry issues
regarding competence to stand trial!" These include explication of constitutional
principles such as the proscription against trying an incompetent defendant2 6 and the
obligation of the court to raise the incompetence issue."' In addition, more
controversial issues, such as credit for time served during the period of treatment
against any subsequent sentence, are also covered."8
Section 7-4.1229 provides that proceedings that do not need the defendant's
personal participation may continue during the period of the defendant's incom-
petence. This provision parallels section 4.06(3) of the Model Penal Code.
Moreover, Jackson v. Indianai' suggests at least a modest version of this rule by
stating that an incompetent defendant could assert "certain defenses such as
insufficiency of the indictment, or make certain pretrial motions through counsel."'
The types of proceedings envisioned by the commentary include suppression hearings,
discovery, and motions involving legal issues. This kind of legal action, the
commentary reasons, can be undertaken without detriment to the defendant and, in
fact, the failure to do so may work affirmative harm.2 If, for instance, the charges
may be dismissed on purely procedural grounds, without the need for the defendant's
215. For an overview of these standards, see Gerald Bennett, A Guided Tour Through Selected ABA
Standards Relating to Incompetence to Stand Trial, 53 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 375 (1985). The standards
have another section on competence that deals with more specialized issues such as competence at time
of sentence, competence to waive counsel, and, most directly germane here, competence to plead guilty
or nolo contendere. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS §§ 7-5.1 to 7-5.3 (1989).
216. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.1.
217. See id. § 7-4.2.
218. See id. § 7-4.15. The commentary to this standard indicates that such credit is the exception,
rather than the norm. The theory against offering credit is that such confinement for treatment benefits
the defendant and thus cannot be analogized to pretrial preventive detention. The commentary suggests,
however, that the time spent in restoring one to competence so that she may stand trial benefits the
system, not the defendant. See id. § 7-4.15 commentary at 257. Accordingly, the defendant should get
credit for this period of confinement. See id.
219. The Model Penal Code contains a similar provision. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06(3)
(1980).
220. The full text of Standard § 7-4.12 reads: "The fact that the defendant has been determined to
be incompetent to stand trial should not preclude further judicial action, defense motions, or discovery
proceedings which may be fairly conducted without the personal participation of the defendant."
CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.12 (1989).
221. 406 U.S. 715 (1972). In Jackson, the Court cited the MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.06(3) and its
alternate favorably for the proposition that the Court's precedents did not preclude certain proceedings
from going forward with an incompetent defendant. See Jackson, 406 U.S. at 740-41. The Court
observed that the Model Penal Code alternate, which allows an evidentiary hearing at which certain
defenses can be put forth, explicitly precludes an insanity defense from proceeding at this stage. See id.
222. Jackson, 406 U.S. at 741.
223. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.12 commentary at 236; see also
Bennett, supra note 216, at 408 (pointing out that the standard, which does not specify the types of
hearings that could proceed, is instead governed by the principle of fairness).
224. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.12 commentary at 236.
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participation, then the defendant is spared the unjust and potentially lengthy
confinement necessary to be restored to competency.
The advantage to proceeding with purely legal motions is obvious. One must then
ask, however: does this provision extend to a plea of not guilty by reason of mental
disease or defect? May that plea be entered "without the personal participation of the
defendant[?]"'  Even if one takes the view that a plea of insanity can be imposed
upon a competent defendant's will, that position does not necessarily extend to an
incompetent defendant. The most troubling issue is that an insanity plea may be
considered an admission of factual guiltY Accordingly, a decision to enter this plea
is one that calls for the defendant's personal participation and thus cannot permissibly
fall within the category of legal proceedings that would be sanctioned by standard
section 7-4.12.'
3. Innocence-Only Hearings
Mental Health Standard section 7-4.13 and several states' endorse the concept
of an innocence-only hearing. The purpose of this hearing, also known as a discharge
hearingz' or a prima facie hearing, is to protect the rights of defendants who are
permanently incompetent"n1 The underlying premise of this proceeding is that,
following a determiration that a defendant could not be restored to competency in the
foreseeable future, either the defenseP3 or the state could move the court for a
hearing on the factual guilt of the defendant. The state would have the burden of
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the factual
offense.' If the state failed at its proof, the defendant would be acquitted
225. Id. § 7-4.12.
226. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363 (1983). Certainly, an insanity verdict includes
a finding of factual guilt. In some jurisdictions the plea itself- or a motion for an insanity acquittal -
may also be an admission that the defendant committed the act. This, of course, would be particularly
true if the defendant does not combine an insanity plea with a not guilty plea. See, e.g., supra note 171.
227. In fairness to the standards' drafters, neither the standard nor its commentary suggests that an
NGRI plea is contemplated by this standard.
228. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 404 (Supp. 1996); 725 ILL. COMp. STAT. ANN. 5/104-25
(West Supp. 1997).
229. Illinois uses te term discharge hearings. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-25 (West
Supp. 1997). See Donald Paull, S.B. 133: The Near Resolution of a Major Problem: Fitness in the
Criminal Law, 56 CHL-KENT L. REv. 1107 (1980), for a discussion of what was then proposed
legislation that created the Illinois innocence-only hearing.
230. See DEL. COD- ANN. tit. 11, § 404 (Supp. 1996).
231. See CIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARD §7-4.13 cmt. at 241-52 (1989).
232. Standard §7-4.13(a) defines a permanently incompetent defendant to be one who has
"previously been adjudged incompetent and there is no substantial probability that the defendant will
become mentally competent to stand trial within the foreseeable future."
233. In Delaware, for example, the incompetent defendant is either confined and treated or, upon
defense motion, the state must make out a prima facie case against the defendant. If the state fails, the
charges are dismissed. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 404 (Supp. 1996).
234. Illinois requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT ANN. 5/104-25
(West Supp. 1997). Delaware requires "sufficient evidence to constitute a prima facie case." DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 11, § 404 (Supp. 1996).
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outrightY5 If the state met its burden, the defendant would continue to be held
pending either additional attempts at restoration of competency or civil commitment
proceedings.
Commentators have criticized innocence-only proceedings, suggesting that the
benefit to the incompetent defendant is illusory.m Often, a conviction would result
in the defendant's earlier release."m A more fundamental question remains: Is the
trial of an incompetent defendant less constitutionally offensive if it is an innocence-
only trial? In both circumstances, the government will undertake to prove the factual
guilt of the defendant. And, in both cases, the defendant, by virtue of being
incompetent, is unable to assist counsel in preparing a defense." 9 Thus, the accuracy
of the proceeding is inherently suspect and constitutionally infirm. Indeed, it more
resembles a grand jury proceeding where the prosecutor puts on her case without any
true adversary.' In an innocence-only proceeding, there is, of course, defense
counsel present. Defense counsel's effectiveness, however, is limited with an
incompetent client who cannot assist in her own defense.u4
V. Incompetent and Acquitted
The Model Penal Code and some states authorize a joint evaluation of competence
and responsibility? 2 Further, the Model Penal Code and some jurisdictions permit
235. Even in the face of an acquittal, the state or a private petitioner could seek an involuntary
commitment based on the same set of facts. As the standard for commitment is clear and convincing,
the petitioner might prevail notwithstanding the defeat in the innocence-only hearing. Thus, the defendant
would not profit, as the result - civil commitment - would most likely be the same. Civil commitment
is the procedure usually followed - in lieu of outright dismissal - following a determination of
permanent incompetence in jurisdictions that do not have innocence-only hearings. See CRIMINAL
JusicE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS § 7-4.13(a)(iii); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-310(b)(2)(D).
236. See 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/104-25 (West Supp. 1997).
237. See Robert A. Burt & Norval Morris, A Proposil for the Abolition of the Incompetency Plea,
40 U. CHi. L. REv. 66, 86-93 (1972). Burt and Morris suggest that an incompetent defendant - if not
able to be restored to competency in six months - should be taken to trial with special procedural
safeguards. See id.
238. See i. at 77-78.
239. In a study that measured attorneys' views of their own clients competence, in cases where
lawyers had doubt about their clients' competence, whether or not formally raised, those clients were
significantly less helpful in fact development than were clients whose competence was not suspect.
Norman G. Poythress et al., Client Abilities to Assist Counsel and Make Decisions in Criminal Cases,
18 LAW & HUM. BEHAv. 437, 442, 445, 447 (1994). Sixty percent of the clients whose competence was
doubted were not helpful, as opposed to only 10% of clients whose competence was doubted. See id.
240. While this assertion tends toward the hyperbolic, the underlying point remains: an incompetent
defendant cannot assist counsel and thus it may be impossible for the defense to refute the facts in any
meaningful way. Arguably, an innocence-only hearing is justified because it can only result in a positive
outcome for a defendant: an outright acquittal or the continuance of the status quo. But questions of the
accuracy and integrity of the criminal justice system still remain, an issue of concern not just to the
defendant but to society at large.
241. After all, if a competent defendant were not deemed indispensable to the enterprise of trial,
then there would be no need for the constitutional holdings forbidding trying an incompetent defendant
and their common law antecedents. See supra text accompanying notes 17-51.
242. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.05 (1980); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-305 (Michie 1997); HAw.
19971
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a defendant to be acquitted by report. 3 It is the presence of both of those pos-
sibilities that will most likely lead to an incompetent defendant being wrongfully
acquitted by reason of insanity.' In most cases, of course, an insanity plea is sought
by the defendant and an acquittal by reason of insanity is a victory. But insanity
acquittals occur that were never sought by the defendant, ' and the consequences of
those acquittals are sufficiently adverse that the process by which they happen is
constitutionally impermissible. The appellate courts of at least four jurisdictions have
addressed the issue of acquitting an incompetent defendant by reason of insanity, with
differing results.?' An examination of those cases follows.
The Arkansas Supreme Court has sanctioned the acquittal by report of an
incompetent defendant. In Stover v. Hamilton,W the court found that an insanity
acquittal of an admittedly incompetent defendant did not violate the constitutional
prohibition against trying and convicting an incompetent defendant' as set out in
Drope v. Missouri." The Stover court reasoned that because the defendant had been
acquitted by report without a trial,' the dictates of Drope were not violated. Such
a resolution turns on an unacceptably cabined reading of Drope. Although an acquittal
by report would obviate the need for a defendant to be competent to assist her attorney
in preparing for trial and at trial itself, other core rationale of Drope remain.
REV. STAT. § 704-404 (1993); WAsH. REv. CODE ANN. § 10.77.060(3) (West 1990).
243. This provision was added to allow for summary disposition by the trial court and may be used
only upon motion of the defendant. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.07 (1980) commentary at x. The ABA
standards do not appear to permit acquittal by report and are generally much more chary about access
to the report. See also ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-313 (Michie 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 552.020 (West
Supp. 1997). An acquittal of an incompetent defendant could also occur - even in the absence of a
statutory provision allowing acquittal by report - if there is a process, informal or otherwise, by which
the prosector and defense attorney can agree to the acquittal.
244. See, e.g., Hawaii v. Lee, 602 P.2d 944 (Haw. 1979) (defense counsel moved for an insanity
acquittal based on a single report finding defendant both incompetent and mentally irresponsible); Ex
parte Kent, 490 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. 1973) (incompetent defendant acquitted by reason of mental disease
or defect after a single report found defendant both incompetent and not responsible).
245. Or, if sought, not properly explained. See Novosel v. Helgemoe, 384 A.2d 124, 128 (N.H.
1978) (holding that the defendant had to be apprised on the potentially lifelong consequences of an NGRI
plea); supra text accompanying notes 161-89 (discussing court-defendant colloquies).
246. See Stover v. Hamilton, 604 S.W.2d 934 (Ark. 1980); Hawaii v. Lee, 602 P.2d 944 (Haw.
1979); Washington v. Coville, 558 P.2d 1346 (Wash. 1977); Exparte Kent, 490 S.W.2d 649 (Mo. 1973).
247. 604 S.W.2d 934 (Ark. 1980).
248. See id. at 937.
249. 420 U.S. 162, 172 (1975).
250. An acquittal pursuant to a report is permitted pursuant to ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-313 (Michie
1997). Although the commentary to the Arkansas statute indicates that this section is patterned after
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.07 (1980), there is one significant difference. Under the Model Penal Code,
an acquittal by report can occur only if requested by the defendant. The correlative Arkansas provision
omits that limitation. Th1is is significant because the entire process can occur without deference to or
even consideration of the defendantfs wishes. The evaluation, which looks at both competence and
responsibility, can be initiated by someone other than the defendant. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-305
(Michie 1997). The court may accept the recommendations of the report and acquit the defendant without
the defendant seeking the acquittal or ever indicating an intent to raise the insanity defense. See ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-2-313 (lichie 1997). Further, this could occur while the defendant is incompetent and/or
without the court explaining to the defendant the consequences of an acquittal by reason of insanity.
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First, an insanity acquittal is a finding of factual guilt.C' An incompetent
defendant cannot tell her lawyer whether or not she committed the offense, cannot
assist in finding the witnesses who can confirm that she was nowhere near the scene,
perhaps cannot even comprehend that she is charged with a crime. Equally troubling,
an incompetent defendant lacks the wherewithal to assess the advantages and
drawbacks of an insanity plea which, if successful, results in the waiver of fundamen-
tal constitutional rights.' This is particularly significant in view of the host of
negative implications flowing from a successful insanity plea.n In sum, the Stover
rationale is not compelling.
Missouri has wrestled with this issue and come to a conclusion opposite that of the
Stover court. In Ex parte Kent, 5 the Missouri Supreme Court ruled en banc that the
detention of an incompetent defendant following an acquittal based on mental disease
or defect amounted to an illegal restraint on liberty.' At the trial level, a psychiatric
report had found the defendant not competent and not responsible. After the state
stipulated to the accuracy of the report, the court ordered the defendant acquitted.
The supreme court remanded the case, stating that, upon a finding of the defendant's
incompetence, the only option was to commit the defendant to restore him to
competence if possible and, if that option was unlikely, to undertake civil commitment
procedures.'
Cognizant of the possibility that defense counsel might want to challenge the
charges on the merits, the court offered up several options. First, it suggested that
defense counsel could assert issues that could be decided without the defendant's
personal participation. The court further stated that due process required that the
trial judge, upon request, must determine that "there is substantial evidence available
to support a conviction."'
The Washington Supreme Court, in Washington v. Coville," found unacceptable
the insanity acquittal of an incompetent person following defense counsel's motion to
acquit.' The court cited several reasons. First, a treatment rationale: the treatment
251. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 363-64 (1983); see also WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 10.77.080 (West 1990) (providing that a defendant who moves for a judgment of acquittal on the
grounds of insanity may not later contest his detention on the ground he did not commit the offense).
252. See supra text accompanying notes 61-72 (discussing Godinez and the necessary predicates to
waiving constitutional rights).
253. See supra text accompanying notes 93-159 (discussing the adverse consequences of an acquittal
by reason of insanity).
254. It was, however, unfortunately repeated a year later in Schockv. Thomas, 625 S.W.2d 521,524
(Ark. 1981).
255. 490 SAV.2d 649 (Mo. 1973) (en bane).
256. See id. at 651.
257. See id. at 650.
258. See id. at 651-52.
259. See id. at 652. For further discussion of reasons a lawyer may want to pursue options during
her client's period of incompetence, see Caleb Foote, A Comment on Pre-Trial Commitment of Criminal
Defendants, 108 U. PA. L. REy. 832, 845-46 (1960).
260. Kent, 490 S.V.2d at 653.
261. 558 P.2d 1346 (Wash. 1977) (en bane).
262. See id. at 1349. It appears that this acquittal occurred after defense counsel's motion to acquit
1997]
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the defendant received as an insanity acquittee would possibly be inappropriate for the
treatment he would need as an incompetent person.'
Second, the court focused on the defendant's right to self-determination. After
acknowledging the fine intentions of counsel, the court cautioned that it was the
defendant who had the right to decide which of the various options he wished to
exercise.' Ironically, after finding the acquittal inappropriate, the court refused to
vacate the judgment of acquittal, declaring that the defendant was incompetent to give
up the rights acquired by the acquittal.'
In Hawaii v. Lee,' a mental examination was conducted on a defendant; the
examination addressed both competence and responsibility and concluded that the
defendant lacked each. Defense counsel moved for an acquittal based on mental
disease, disorder, or defect but the court deferred action on the motion because of the
defendant's incompetence. Defense counsel then appealed. The Hawaii Supreme Court
held that "so long as defense alternatives of a substantive nature may be available,"
the proceedings must be suspended until the defendant regains the ability to assist
counsel in choosing from among the options.' Any prejudice resulting from the
delay is "largely neutralized," the court said, by the statutory provision permitting
dismissal of the charges if too much time has elapsed so that prosecution would be
unjust.'
In each of the above cases, the defendant was acquitted by reason of insanity while
incompetent.' Such a result violates the same principles that prohibit the trial and
conviction of an incompetent defendant, including the accuracy and integrity of the
process, and the defendant's right to self-determination. In these cases, the result may
have been occasioned by an agreement between the prosecutor and defense counsel.
and a "trial of the insanity issue raised by the motion." Id. at 1347. In its order, the court simultaneously
found the defendant, a mentally retarded man with the mental capacity of a five- or six-year-old child,
incompetent to stand trial and not guilty by reason of insanity. See id. This latter conclusion was made
even in the absence of findings that the defendant had in fact committed the acts charged. See id. at
1347. If a trial did in fact occur, that would have constituted a facial violation of Drope v. Missouri, 420
U.S. 162, 172 (1975), which prohibits the trial of an incompetent defendant.
263. See Coville, 558 P.2d at 1349. This reasoning perhaps foreshadows the idea of therapeutic
jurisprudence developed a decade later by Wexler and Winick. See generally DAVID WEXLER & BRUCE
WINICK, ESSAYS IN THEitAPEUTIc JURISPRUDENCE (1991). Further, this rationale begs the question: if
the criminal case is resolved because of the acquittal, then the issue of the defendant's incompetence and
the appropriate treatment necessary to restore him to competence becomes moot, at least to the extent
of competence to stand trial. Competence can, of course, be relevant to other questions such as the right
to refuse treatment.
264. See Coville, 558 P.2d at 1348. The court also noted that no guardian had been appointed to
recommend whether the defendant "could or should" give consent to the filing of the acquittal motion
by counsel. Id.
265. See id. at 1349. The court questioned the authority of counsel (new since the acquittal) to even
file the motion challenging the legality of the acquittal. See id.
266. 602 P.2d 944 (Haw. 1979).
267. Id. at 946.
268. Id.




WHAT'S COMPETENCE GOT TO DO WITH IT
But as the Court of Appeals of Florida has said, "Good intentions do not override
constitutional rights."'
VI. Conclusion
The pretrial acquittal of an incompetent defendant may arise in various ways. It
may be at the behest of defense counsel who believes that an acquittal is in a
defendants interest. An insanity acquittal, however, is accompanied by adverse
consequences and should be sought only by a competent defendant who has been
explained the consequences and who desires to pursue such a course.
The pretrial insanity acquittal of incompetent defendants is very likely more
pervasive than the cases would indicate for several reasons.27' First, it is unlikely that
an insanity acquittal will be seen as detrimental and worthy of challenge. Lawyers and
judges alike may have benign motives of treatment that inform their actions. Second,
if the defendant is incompetent, she is unlikely to be the catalyst for challenging an
insanity acquittal.
The problem of wrongful insanity acquittals can be addressed in several ways. Most
obviously, the United States Supreme Court could declare that a pretrial acquittal of
an incompetent defendant violates due process. Until that occurs, there are other
changes, through either legislative or decisional law, that would go a long way toward
minimizing the problem. First, states should require that the competence question be
evaluated separately, thus reducing the temptation for a court to acquit a defendant
after it sees a report simultaneously finding that defendant incompetent and not
responsible. This bifurcated inquiry, although contrary to the Model Penal Code, is
recommended by the more recent ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards.
Second, courts should be required to personally address the defendant to see if she
understands the consequences involved in an insanity acquittal and understands that
she is waiving fundamental constitutional rights. There is no justification for treating
an insanity plea any differently from a guilty or no contest plea. This court-defendant
colloquy would ensure that the plea is not being forced and that the defendant has
been made aware of the negative consequences. Of course, such a colloquy would
require a competent defendant.
Third and finally, defense lawyers and judges must start realizing that the
consequences of an insanity acquittal can be quite severe. A defendant should be able
to make the decision for herself, which can only happen if she is competent. Without
judicial and defense counsel diligence on this issue, defendants like Scarlett Snopes
will continue to be wrongfully acquitted.
270. Harringer v. Florida, 566 So. 2d 893, 894 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
271. In the authors clinical program's mental health clinic, orders of acquittals for incompetent
defendants are no longer a source of surprise.
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